HISTORIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

I am by no means an expert in the field of historiography (no surprises there). The following annotated bibliography simply includes some of those works that I found particularly helpful in my research for my M.Litt. dissertation. These are works that I found edifying on a variety of levels both academically and personally. They address central issues concerned with the nature of history, they provide a vocabulary and conceptual frameworks for understanding and talking about history, and they also provide insight into some of what is being currently discussed in the wider discipline of historiography. Underlined works are those that I most recommend as introductions to historiography. Works with an asterisk (*) are those works on my short list of recommendations. My highest recommendation would go to *Telling the Truth about History* with the double asterisk (**).


Part One — Intellectual Absolutisms
1. The Heroic Model of Science
2. Scientific History and the Idea of Modernity
3. History Makes a Nation

Part Two — Absolutisms Dethroned
4. Competing Histories of America
5. Discovering the Clay Feet of Science
6. Postmodernism and the Crisis of Modernity

Part Three — A New Republic of Learning
7. Truth and Objectivity
8. The Future of History

Reviews and Discussions of *Telling the Truth about History*


Bunzl is a philosopher of history and in this book of connected essays attempts to address some of the philosophical concerns of historiography: objectivity, facts, and realism vs. anti-realism. Bunzl argues for a realist, though not an objectivist, conception of history. “My thesis is rather modest. It is this: it is hard not to be an ‘objectivist’ in practice. But the kind of objectivist you end up being does not embrace” all of the notions of objectivity which Novick writes about. “Separating the wheat from the chaff is the intellectual work of this project” (2).

*Carr, Edward H. *What Is History?* London: Macmillan, 1961. For forty years this has been a standard text on the question of history. What I found particularly helpful were Carr’s discussions of history as a social process. “History, then, in both senses of the word—meaning both the enquiry conducted by the historian and the facts of the past into which he enquires—is a social process, in which individuals are engaged as social beings. . . .” The reciprocal process of interaction between the historian and his facts, what I have called the dialogue*
between present and past, is a dialogue not between abstract and isolated individuals, but between the society of today and the society of yesterday. History, in Burckhardt’s words, is ‘the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another’. The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past. To enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present is the dual function of history” (49).


Haskell, Thomas L. *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. Though I didn’t get a chance to read this directly though references were made to it in the secondary literature. My sense is that one of its values is its discussion of the concept of professionalization and how it operates within a discipline. I expect it also demonstrates why postmodernism is such a challenge not only to historical profession but to all professionalized disciplines. In the last third of the nineteenth century, a need for the professionalization of the social sciences arose in the United States due to a crisis in intellectual authority and a desire for order as a result of the Civil War. People imagined that professionalization could reestablish a place of authority and provide stability and a sense of national unity. Sought were “communities of the competent” who would “identify competence, cultivate it, and confer authority on those who possessed it in accordance with . . . criteria that were not in any obvious way personal, partisan, or particular. The criteria of judgment had to seem truly a product of consensus among the competent, beyond the power of any individual, clique, or party to control, and hence impersonal, objective, value-free—not mere opinion but ‘truth’” (89).

Haskell, Thomas L. “Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream*.” *History and Theory* 29 (1990): 129–57. Haskell reviews *That Noble Dream* and, in contrast to Novick who regards the ideal of objectivity as “essentially confused,” regards “objectivity, properly understood, as a worthy goal for historians” (130). Haskell argues that while Novick’s rhetoric is one of eschewing the notion of objectivity, in actual practice his work passes with flying colors what Haskell regards as all the standards of objectivity. Haskell sees that where he and Novick are different is not so much in how each practices history but in how each speaks about the practice of history. “Novick’s advice to the profession evidently is to cut loose from the ideal, declaring it obsolete—even while silently perpetuating many of the practices associated with it. In contrast, my inclination is to protect those practices by continuing to honor the ideal, meanwhile ridding it of unwanted connotations. Fatefully dissimilar though the two strategies may be, they do not aim at very different outcomes in terms of historical practice” (131). One of the most valuable things about this article is the way the discussion makes a distinction between a scholar’s rhetoric and their actual practice, such that, two scholars may actually engage in quite similar practices and so produce quite similar products though they may choose for a variety of reasons to conceptualize and describe their tasks in quite different, even opposing ways.

*Iggers, Georg G. *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1997. As the title indicates, Iggers writes a history of the historical profession in the twentieth century. Iggers covers some of the same general territory as *Telling the Truth about History* but with different emphases, and so I found the two books to be quite complementary. Iggers helps the reader see why and to what extent postmodernism poses such a challenge to the historical profession. “Central to the process of professionalization was the firm belief in the scientific status of history. The concept science was, to be sure, understood differently by historians than by natural scientists, . . . But the historians
shared the optimism of the professionalized sciences generally that methodologically controlled research makes objective knowledge possible. For them as for other scientists truth consisted in the correspondence of knowledge to an objective reality that, for the historian, constituted the past ‘as it had actually occurred.’ The self-definition of history as a scientific discipline implied for the work of the historian a sharp division between scientific and literary discourse, between professional historians and amateurs” (2) Yet, “Increasingly in the last twenty years the assumptions upon which historical research and writing have been based since the emergence of history as a professional discipline in the nineteenth century have been questioned” (1).

Iggers, Georg G. “The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought.” *History and Theory* 2 (1962): 17–40. Iggers explores the significant role that Leopold von Ranke played in the development and thought of the historical profession in both Germany and the United States. Iggers argues that Ranke’s historical idealism was well-understood in Germany and almost entirely misunderstood by American historians who received their doctoral training in Germany. In failing to apprehend Ranke’s German idealism, American historians mistook Ranke’s famous dictum wie es eigentlich gewesen as meaning the past “as it really, or actually, happened” when for Ranke it meant the past “as it essentially happened.”


*Jenkins, Keith. *Re-thinking History*. London: Routledge, 1991. This little book provides a brief introduction to and argument for a postmodern view of history. Though one need to follow Jenkins’ route, Jenkins does demonstrate in a very helpful way that history is not the past but a mode of discourse about the past. “history is one of a series of discourses about the world. These discourses do not create the world (that physical stuff on which we apparently live) but they do appropriate it and give it all the meanings it has. that bit of the world which is history’s (ostensible) object of enquiry is the past. History as discourse is thus in a different category to that which it discourses about, that is, the past and history are different things. Additionally, the past and history are not stitched into each other such that only one historical reading of the past is absolutely necessary. The past and history float free of each other, they are ages and miles apart. For the same object of enquiry can be read differently by different discursive practices (a landscape can be read/interpreted differently by geographers, sociologists, historians, artists, economists, etc.) whilst, internal to each, there are different interpretive readings over time and space; as far as history is concerned historiography shows this” (5). “History is shifting discourse constructed by historians and that from the existence of the past no one reading is entailed: change the gaze, shift the perspective and new readings appear. Yet although historians know all this, most seem to studiously ignore it and strive for objectivity and truth nevertheless. And this striving for truth cuts through ideological/methodological positions” (13).

Jenkins, Keith. *On ‘What is History’: From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White*. London: Routledge, 1995. This is a helpful introduction to and summary of a handful of the most influential thinkers on the question of *What is History?*


Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Novick takes his title from the title of Charles A. Beard’s 1935 essay, itself a response to Theodore Clark Smith’s use of the phrase (see below). In this book, Novick traces the history of the American historical profession through the lens of the concept that lay at the heart and foundation of the American historical profession, namely, the ideal of objectivity. Novick describes not so much what historical professionals actually did as much as he describes what historians thought they were up, and in the process hopes to demonstrate that the ideal of objectivity is and has essentially confused and so should be abandoned.

Reviews and Discussions of That Noble Dream


**Ongoing Conversation in the American Historical Association**

In 1934 the American Historical Association (AHA) celebrated its 50th anniversary. Almost in anticipation of that anniversary, Carl Becker and Charles A. Beard both delivered presidential addresses to the AHA in which they challenge the positivistic, scientific notions of objectivity that had been the hallmark of the historical profession. Becker and Beard were the voices of an influential minority attempting to redefine the traditional, accepted views of historiography. There two essays “Everyman His Own Historian” and “Written History as an Act of Faith” caused quite a stir and have become quite well-known. These essays from the 1930s are particularly interesting, especially the exchanges between Beard and Smith.

**1930s**

Becker, Carl. “Everyman His Own Historian.” *American Historical Review* 37 (1932): 221–36. Becker delivered this essay as the presidential address before the AHA on December 29, 1931.


Smith, Theodore Clark. “The Writing of American History in America, From 1884 to 1934.” *American Historical Review* 40 (1935): 439–49. Smith delivered this essay the year after Beard’s presidential address and attempts to counter Beard’s supposed embrace of subjectivism by calling historians to return to their objectivist foundations before it is too late. “It may be that another fifty years will see the end of an era in historiography, the final extinction of a noble dream, and history, save as an instrument of entertainment, or of social control will not be permitted to exist. In that case, it will be time for the American Historical Association to disband, for the intellectual assumptions on which it is founded will have been taken away from beneath it. My hope is, none the less, that those of us who date from what may then seem an age of quaint beliefs and forgotten loyalties, may go down with our flags flying” (49).

Beard, Charles A. “That Noble Dream.” *American Historical Review* 41 (1935): 74–87. In response to Smith, Beard argues that those who reject the quest for objective truth do not reject truth. Beard reiterates that history is inevitably an interpretive enterprise, facts do not speak for themselves. For Beard we have less to fear from those historians who present their histories as interpretations, be it economic or social, than we have to fear from those who historians who present their histories as simply the way things happened based upon the facts and so are simply disguising up their own biases, presuppositions, and interpretations under the cloak of objectivity.

**1980s**
